Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015) (2024)

HearOpinion Announcement - June 26, 2015

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision beforepublication in the preliminary print of the United States Reports.Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, SupremeCourt of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, of anytypographical or other formal errors, in order that corrections maybe made before the preliminary print goes to press.SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES_________________Nos. 14 556, 14-562, 14-571 and 14 574_________________JAMES OBERGEFELL, et al., PETITIONERS14 556v.RICHARD HODGES, DIRECTOR, OHIO DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, et al.;VALERIA TANCO, et al., PETITIONERS14 562v.BILL HASLAM, GOVERNOR OF TENNESSEE, et al.;APRIL DeBOER, et al., PETITIONERS14 571v.RICK SNYDER, GOVERNOR OF MICHIGAN, et al.; ANDGREGORY BOURKE, et al., PETITIONERS14 574v.STEVE BESHEAR, GOVERNOR OF KENTUCKYon writs of certiorari to the united states court of appeals forthe sixth circuit[June 26, 2015]Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court.The Constitution promises liberty to all within its reach, aliberty that includes certain specific rights that allow persons,within a lawful realm, to define and express their identity. Thepetitioners in these cases seek to find that liberty by marryingsomeone of the same sex and having their marriages deemed lawful onthe same terms and conditions as marriages between persons of theopposite sex.IThese cases come from Michigan, Kentucky, Ohio, and Tennessee,States that define marriage as a union between one man and onewoman. See, e.g., Mich. Const., Art. I, 25; Ky. Const.233A; Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 3101.01 (Lexis 2008); Tenn. Const., Art.XI, 18. The petitioners are 14 same-sex couples and two men whosesame-sex partners are deceased. The respondents are state officialsresponsible for enforcing the laws in question. The petitionersclaim the respondents violate the Fourteenth Amendment by denyingthem the right to marry or to have their marriages, lawfullyperformed in another State, given full recognition.Petitioners filed these suits in United States District Courtsin their home States. Each District Court ruled in their favor.Citations to those cases are in Appendix A, infra. Therespondents appealed the decisions against them to the UnitedStates Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. It consolidated thecases and reversed the judgments of the District Courts.DeBoerv. Snyder, 772 F. 3d 388 (2014). The Court ofAppeals held that a State has no constitutional obligation tolicense same-sex marriages or to recognize same-sex marriagesperformed out of State.The petitioners sought certiorari. This Court granted review,limited to two questions. 574 U. S. ___ (2015). The first,presented by the cases from Michigan and Kentucky, is whether theFourteenth Amendment requires a State to license a marriage betweentwo people of the same sex. The second, presented by the cases fromOhio, Tennessee, and, again, Kentucky, is whether the FourteenthAmendment requires a State to recognize a same-sex marriagelicensed and performed in a State which does grant that right.IIBefore addressing the principles and precedents thatgovern these cases, it is appropriate to note the history of thesubject now before the Court.AFrom their beginning to their most recent page, the annals ofhuman history reveal the transcendent importance of marriage. Thelifelong union of a man and a woman always has promised nobilityand dignity to all persons, without regard to their station inlife. Marriage is sacred to those who live by their religions andoffers unique fulfillment to those who find meaning in the secularrealm. Its dynamic allows two people to find a life that could notbe found alone, for a marriage becomes greater than just the twopersons. Rising from the most basic human needs, marriage isessential to our most profound hopes and aspirations.The centrality of marriage to the human condition makes itunsurprising that the institution has existed for millennia andacross civilizations. Since the dawn of history, marriage hastransformed strangers into relatives, binding families andsocieties together. Confucius taught that marriage lies at thefoundation of government. 2 Li Chi: Book of Rites 266 (C. Chai& W. Chai eds., J. Legge transl. 1967). This wisdom was echoedcenturies later and half a world away by Cicero, who wrote, "Thefirst bond of society is marriage; next, children; and then thefamily." See De Officiis 57 (W. Miller transl. 1913). There areuntold references to the beauty of marriage in religious andphilosophical texts spanning time, cultures, and faiths, as well asin art and literature in all their forms. It is fair and necessaryto say these references were based on the understanding thatmarriage is a union between two persons of the opposite sex.That history is the beginning of these cases. The respondentssay it should be the end as well. To them, it would demean atimeless institution if the concept and lawful status of marriagewere extended to two persons of the same sex. Marriage, in theirview, is by its nature a gender-differentiated union of man andwoman. This view long has been held and continues to be held ingood faith by reasonable and sincere people here and throughout theworld.The petitioners acknowledge this history but contend that thesecases cannot end there. Were their intent to demean the reveredidea and reality of marriage, the petitioners' claims would be of adifferent order. But that is neither their purpose nor theirsubmission. To the contrary, it is the enduring importance ofmarriage that underlies the petitioners' contentions. This, theysay, is their whole point. Far from seeking to devalue marriage,the petitioners seek it for themselves because of their respect andneed for its privileges and responsibilities. And their immutablenature dictates that same-sex marriage is their only real path tothis profound commitment.Recounting the circ*mstances of three of these cases illustratesthe urgency of the petitioners' cause from their perspective.Petitioner James Obergefell, a plaintiff in the Ohio case, met JohnArthur over two decades ago. They fell in love and started a lifetogether, establishing a lasting, committed relation. In 2011,however, Arthur was diagnosed with amyotrophic lateral sclerosis,or ALS. This debilitating disease is progressive, with no knowncure. Two years ago, Obergefell and Arthur decided to commit to oneanother, resolving to marry before Arthur died. To fulfill theirmutual promise, they traveled from Ohio to Maryland, where same-sexmarriage was legal. It was difficult for Arthur to move, and so thecouple were wed inside a medical transport plane as it remained onthe tarmac in Baltimore. Three months later, Arthur died. Ohio lawdoes not permit Obergefell to be listed as the surviving spouse onArthur's death certificate. By statute, they must remain strangerseven in death, a state-imposed separation Obergefell deems "hurtfulfor the rest of time." App. in No. 14 556 etc., p. 38. He broughtsuit to be shown as the surviving spouse on Arthur's deathcertificate.April DeBoer and Jayne Rowse are co-plaintiffs in the case fromMichigan. They celebrated a commitment ceremony to honor theirpermanent relation in 2007. They both work as nurses, DeBoer in aneonatal unit and Rowse in an emergency unit. In 2009, DeBoer andRowse fostered and then adopted a baby boy. Later that same year,they welcomed another son into their family. The new baby, bornprematurely and abandoned by his biological mother, requiredaround-the-clock care. The next year, a baby girl with specialneeds joined their family. Michigan, however, permits onlyopposite-sex married couples or single individuals to adopt, soeach child can have only one woman as his or her legal parent. Ifan emergency were to arise, schools and hospitals may treat thethree children as if they had only one parent. And, were tragedy tobefall either DeBoer or Rowse, the other would have no legal rightsover the children she had not been permitted to adopt. This coupleseeks relief from the continuing uncertainty their unmarried statuscreates in their lives.Army Reserve Sergeant First Class Ijpe DeKoe and his partnerThomas Kostura, co-plaintiffs in the Tennessee case, fell in love.In 2011, DeKoe received orders to deploy to Afghanistan. Beforeleaving, he and Kostura married in New York. A week later, DeKoebegan his deployment, which lasted for almost a year. When hereturned, the two settled in Tennessee, where DeKoe works full-timefor the Army Reserve. Their lawful marriage is stripped from themwhenever they reside in Tennessee, returning and disappearing asthey travel across state lines. DeKoe, who served this Nation topreserve the freedom the Constitution protects, must endure asubstantial burden.The cases now before the Court involve other petitioners aswell, each with their own experiences. Their stories reveal thatthey seek not to denigrate marriage but rather to live their lives,or honor their spouses' memory, joined by its bond.BThe ancient origins of marriage confirm its centrality, but ithas not stood in isolation from developments in law and society.The history of marriage is one of both continuity and change. Thatinstitution even as confined to opposite-sex relations has evolvedover time.For example, marriage was once viewed as an arrangement by thecouple's parents based on political, religious, and financialconcerns; but by the time of the Nation's founding it wasunderstood to be a voluntary contract between a man and a woman.See N. Cott, Public Vows: A History of Marriage and the Nation 9 17(2000); S. Coontz, Marriage, A History 15 16 (2005). As the roleand status of women changed, the institution further evolved. Underthe centuries-old doctrine of coverture, a married man and womanwere treated by the State as a single, male-dominated legal entity.See 1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 430(1765). As women gained legal, political, and property rights, andas society began to understand that women have their own equaldignity, the law of coverture was abandoned. See Brief forHistorians of Marriage et al. as Amici Curiae 16 19. Theseand other developments in the institution of marriage over the pastcenturies were not mere superficial changes. Rather, they workeddeep transformations in its structure, affecting aspects ofmarriage long viewed by many as essential. See generally N. Cott,Public Vows; S. Coontz, Marriage; H. Hartog, Man & Wife inAmerica: A History (2000).These new insights have strengthened, not weakened, theinstitution of marriage. Indeed, changed understandings of marriageare characteristic of a Nation where new dimensions of freedombecome apparent to new generations, often through perspectives thatbegin in pleas or protests and then are considered in the politicalsphere and the judicial process.This dynamic can be seen in the Nation's experiences with therights of gays and lesbians. Until the mid-20th century, same-sexintimacy long had been condemned as immoral by the state itself inmost Western nations, a belief often embodied in the criminal law.For this reason, among others, many persons did not deemhom*osexuals to have dignity in their own distinct identity. Atruthful declaration by same-sex couples of what was in theirhearts had to remain unspoken. Even when a greater awareness of thehumanity and integrity of hom*osexual persons came in the periodafter World War II, the argument that gays and lesbians had a justclaim to dignity was in conflict with both law and widespreadsocial conventions. Same-sex intimacy remained a crime in manyStates. Gays and lesbians were prohibited from most governmentemployment, barred from military service, excluded underimmigration laws, targeted by police, and burdened in their rightsto associate. See Brief for Organization of American Historians asAmicus Curiae 5 28.For much of the 20th century, moreover, hom*osexuality wastreated as an illness. When the American Psychiatric Associationpublished the first Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of MentalDisorders in 1952, hom*osexuality was classified as a mentaldisorder, a position adhered to until 1973. See Position Statementon hom*osexuality and Civil Rights, 1973, in 131 Am. J. Psychiatry497 (1974). Only in more recent years have psychiatrists and othersrecognized that sexual orientation is both a normal expression ofhuman sexuality and immutable. See Brief for American PsychologicalAssociation et al. as Amici Curiae 7 17.In the late 20th century, following substantial cultural andpolitical developments, same-sex couples began to lead more openand public lives and to establish families. This development wasfollowed by a quite extensive discussion of the issue in bothgovernmental and private sectors and by a shift in public attitudestoward greater tolerance. As a result, questions about the rightsof gays and lesbians soon reached the courts, where the issue couldbe discussed in the formal discourse of the law.This Court first gave detailed consideration to the legal statusof hom*osexuals in Bowersv. Hardwick, 478 U. S. 186 (1986). There it upheld the constitutionality of a Georgia law deemed tocriminalize certain hom*osexual acts. Ten years later, inRomerv. Evans, 517 U. S. 620 (1996) , the Courtinvalidated an amendment to Colorado's Constitution that sought toforeclose any branch or political subdivision of the State fromprotecting persons against discrimination based on sexualorientation. Then, in 2003, the Court overruled Bowers,holding that laws making same-sex intimacy a crime "demea[n] thelives of hom*osexual persons." Lawrencev. Texas, 539 U. S.558 .Against this background, the legal question of same-sex marriagearose. In 1993, the Hawaii Supreme Court held Hawaii's lawrestricting marriage to opposite-sex couples constituted aclassification on the basis of sex and was therefore subject tostrict scrutiny under the Hawaii Constitution. Baehrv.Lewin, 74 Haw. 530, 852 P. 2d 44. Although this decision didnot mandate that same-sex marriage be allowed, some States wereconcerned by its implications and reaffirmed in their laws thatmarriage is defined as a union between opposite-sex partners. Sotoo in 1996, Congress passed the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA),110Stat. 2419, defining marriage for all federal-law purposes as"only a legal union between one man and one woman as husband andwife." 1 U. S. C. 7.The new and widespread discussion of the subject led otherStates to a different conclusion. In 2003, the Supreme JudicialCourt of Massachusetts held the State's Constitution guaranteedsame-sex couples the right to marry. See Goodridgev. Departmentof Public Health, 440 Mass. 309, 798 N. E. 2d 941 (2003).After that ruling, some additional States granted marriage rightsto same-sex couples, either through judicial or legislativeprocesses. These decisions and statutes are cited in Appendix B,infra. Two Terms ago, in United Statesv. Windsor,570 U. S. ___ (2013), this Court invalidated DOMA to the extent itbarred the Federal Government from treating same-sex marriages asvalid even when they were lawful in the State where they werelicensed. DOMA, the Court held, impermissibly disparaged thosesame-sex couples "who wanted to affirm their commitment to oneanother before their children, their family, their friends, andtheir community." Id., at ___ (slip op., at 14).Numerous cases about same-sex marriage have reached the UnitedStates Courts of Appeals in recent years. In accordance with thejudicial duty to base their decisions on principled reasons andneutral discussions, without scornful or disparaging commentary,courts have written a substantial body of law considering all sidesof these issues. That case law helps to explain and formulate theunderlying principles this Court now must consider. With theexception of the opinion here under review and one other, seeCitizens for Equal Protection v. Bruning, 455 F. 3d 859, 864 868(CAAdd hyphens between digits006), the Courts of Appeals have heldthat excluding same-sex couples from marriage violates theConstitution. There also have been many thoughtful District Courtdecisions addressing same-sex marriage and most of them, too, haveconcluded same-sex couples must be allowed to marry. In additionthe highest courts of many States have contributed to this ongoingdialogue in decisions interpreting their own State Constitutions.These state and federal judicial opinions are cited in Appendix A,infra.After years of litigation, legislation, referenda, and thediscussions that attended these public acts, the States are nowdivided on the issue of same-sex marriage. See Office of the Atty.Gen. of Maryland, The State of Marriage Equality in America,State-by-State Supp. (2015).IIIUnder the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, noState shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,without due process of law." The fundamental liberties protected bythis Clause include most of the rights enumerated in the Bill ofRights. See Duncanv. Louisiana, 391 U. S. 145 149 (1968).In addition these liberties extend to certain personal choicescentral to individual dignity and autonomy, including intimatechoices that define personal identity and beliefs. See,e.g., Eisenstadtv. Baird, 405 U. S. 438, 453(1972) ; Griswoldv. Connecticut, 381 U. S. 479 486(1965).The identification and protection of fundamental rights is anenduring part of the judicial duty to interpret the Constitution.That responsibility, however, "has not been reduced to anyformula." Poev. Ullman, 367 U. S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan,J., dissenting). Rather, it requires courts to exercise reasonedjudgment in identifying interests of the person so fundamental thatthe State must accord them its respect. See ibid. Thatprocess is guided by many of the same considerations relevant toanalysis of other constitutional provisions that set forth broadprinciples rather than specific requirements. History and traditionguide and discipline this inquiry but do not set its outerboundaries. See Lawrence, supra, at 572. Thatmethod respects our history and learns from it without allowing thepast alone to rule the present.The nature of injustice is that we may not always see it in ourown times. The generations that wrote and ratified the Bill ofRights and the Fourteenth Amendment did not presume to know theextent of freedom in all of its dimensions, and so they entrustedto future generations a charter protecting the right of all personsto enjoy liberty as we learn its meaning. When new insight revealsdiscord between the Constitution's central protections and areceived legal stricture, a claim to liberty must be addressed.Applying these established tenets, the Court has long held theright to marry is protected by the Constitution. In Lovingv.Virginia, 388 U. S. 1, 12 (1967) , which invalidated bans oninterracial unions, a unanimous Court held marriage is "one of thevital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happinessby free men." The Court reaffirmed that holding in Zablockiv.Redhail, 434 U. S. 374, 384 (1978) , which held the right tomarry was burdened by a law prohibiting fathers who were behind onchild support from marrying. The Court again applied this principlein Turnerv. Safley, 482 U. S. 78, 95 (1987) , which heldthe right to marry was abridged by regulations limiting theprivilege of prison inmates to marry. Over time and in othercontexts, the Court has reiterated that the right to marry isfundamental under the Due Process Clause. See, e.g., M. L. B.v.S. L. J., 519 U. S. 102, 116 (1996) ; Cleveland Bd. ofEd.v. LaFleur, 414 U. S. 632 640 (1974); Griswold,supra, at 486; Skinnerv. Oklahoma ex rel.Williamson, 316 U. S. 535, 541 (1942) ; Meyerv.Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390, 399 (1923) .It cannot be denied that this Court's cases describing the rightto marry presumed a relationship involving opposite-sex partners.The Court, like many institutions, has made assumptions defined bythe world and time of which it is a part. This was evident inBakerv. Nelson, 409 U. S. 810 , a one-line summarydecision issued in 1972, holding the exclusion of same-sex couplesfrom marriage did not present a substantial federal question.Still, there are other, more instructive precedents. ThisCourt's cases have expressed constitutional principles of broaderreach. In defining the right to marry these cases have identifiedessential attributes of that right based in history, tradition, andother constitutional liberties inherent in this intimate bond. See,e.g., Lawrence, 539 U. S., at 574;Turner, supra, at 95; Zablocki,supra, at 384; Loving, supra, at 12;Griswold, supra, at 486. And in assessing whetherthe force and rationale of its cases apply to same-sex couples, theCourt must respect the basic reasons why the right to marry hasbeen long protected. See, e.g., Eisenstadt,supra, at 453 454; Poe, supra, at 542553 (Harlan, J., dissenting).This analysis compels the conclusion that same-sex couples mayexercise the right to marry. The four principles and traditions tobe discussed demonstrate that the reasons marriage is fundamentalunder the Constitution apply with equal force to same-sexcouples.A first premise of the Court's relevant precedents is that theright to personal choice regarding marriage is inherent in theconcept of individual autonomy. This abiding connection betweenmarriage and liberty is why Loving invalidated interracialmarriage bans under the Due Process Clause. See 388 U. S., at 12;see also Zablocki, supra, at 384 (observingLoving held "the right to marry is of fundamentalimportance for all individuals"). Like choices concerningcontraception, family relationships, procreation, and childrearing,all of which are protected by the Constitution, decisionsconcerning marriage are among the most intimate that an individualcan make. See Lawrence, supra, at 574. Indeed,the Court has noted it would be contradictory "to recognize a rightof privacy with respect to other matters of family life and notwith respect to the decision to enter the relationship that is thefoundation of the family in our society." Zablocki,supra, at 386.Choices about marriage shape an individual's destiny. As theSupreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts has explained, because "itfulfils yearnings for security, safe haven, and connection thatexpress our common human ity, civil marriage is an esteemedinstitution, and the decision whether and whom to marry is amonglife's momentous acts of self-definition." Goodridge, 440Mass., at 322, 798 N. E. 2d, at 955.The nature of marriage is that, through its enduring bond, twopersons together can find other freedoms, such as expression,intimacy, and spirituality. This is true for all persons, whatevertheir sexual orientation. See Windsor, 570 U. S., at ______ (slip op., at 22 23). There is dignity in the bond between twomen or two women who seek to marry and in their autonomy to makesuch profound choices. Cf. Loving, supra, at 12("[T]he freedom to marry, or not marry, a person of another raceresides with the individual and cannot be infringed by theState").A second principle in this Court's jurisprudence is that theright to marry is fundamental because it supports a two-personunion unlike any other in its importance to the committedindividuals. This point was central to Griswold v.Connecticut, which held the Constitution protects theright of married couples to use contraception. 381 U. S., at 485.Suggesting that marriage is a right "older than the Bill ofRights," Griswold described marriage this way:"Marriage is a coming together for better or for worse,hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of being sacred. Itis an association that promotes a way of life, not causes; aharmony in living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, notcommercial or social projects. Yet it is an association for asnoble a purpose as any involved in our prior decisions. "Id., at 486.And in Turner, the Court again acknowledged theintimate association protected by this right, holding prisonerscould not be denied the right to marry because their committedrelationships satisfied the basic reasons why marriage is afundamental right. See 482 U. S., at 95 96. The right to marry thusdignifies couples who "wish to define themselves by theircommitment to each other." Windsor, supra, at ___(slip op., at 14). Marriage responds to the universal fear that alonely person might call out only to find no one there. It offersthe hope of companionship and understanding and assurance thatwhile both still live there will be someone to care for theother.As this Court held in Lawrence, same-sex couples havethe same right as opposite-sex couples to enjoy intimateassociation. Lawrence invalidated laws that made same-sexintimacy a criminal act. And it acknowledged that "[w]hen sexualityfinds overt expression in intimate conduct with another person, theconduct can be but one element in a personal bond that is moreenduring." 539 U. S., at 567. But while Lawrence confirmeda dimension of freedom that allows individuals to engage inintimate association without criminal liability, it does not followthat freedom stops there. Outlaw to outcast may be a step forward,but it does not achieve the full promise of liberty.A third basis for protecting the right to marry is that itsafeguards children and families and thus draws meaning fromrelated rights of childrearing, procreation, and education. SeePiercev. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510 (1925) ;Meyer, 262 U. S., at 399. The Court has recognized theseconnections by describing the varied rights as a unified whole:"[T]he right to 'marry, establish a home and bring up children' isa central part of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause."Zablocki, 434 U. S., at 384 (quoting Meyer,supra, at 399). Under the laws of the several States, someof marriage's protections for children and families are material.But marriage also confers more profound benefits. By givingrecognition and legal structure to their parents' relationship,marriage allows children "to understand the integrity and closenessof their own family and its concord with other families in theircommunity and in their daily lives." Windsor,supra, at ___ (slip op., at 23). Marriage also affords thepermanency and stability important to children's best interests.See Brief for Scholars of the Constitutional Rights of Children asAmici Curiae 22 27.As all parties agree, many same-sex couples provide loving andnurturing homes to their children, whether biological or adopted.And hundreds of thousands of children are presently being raised bysuch couples. See Brief for Gary J. Gates as Amicus Curiae4. Most States have allowed gays and lesbians to adopt, either asindividuals or as couples, and many adopted and foster childrenhave same-sex parents, see id., at 5. This providespowerful confirmation from the law itself that gays and lesbianscan create loving, supportive families.Excluding same-sex couples from marriage thus conflicts with acentral premise of the right to marry. Without the recognition,stability, and predictability marriage offers, their childrensuffer the stigma of knowing their families are somehow lesser.They also suffer the significant material costs of being raised byunmarried parents, relegated through no fault of their own to amore difficult and uncertain family life. The marriage laws atissue here thus harm and humiliate the children of same-sexcouples. See Windsor, supra, at ___ (slip op., at23).That is not to say the right to marry is less meaningful forthose who do not or cannot have children. An ability, desire, orpromise to procreate is not and has not been a prerequisite for avalid marriage in any State. In light of precedent protecting theright of a married couple not to procreate, it cannot be said theCourt or the States have conditioned the right to marry on thecapacity or commitment to procreate. The constitutional marriageright has many aspects, of which childbearing is only one.Fourth and finally, this Court's cases and the Nation'straditions make clear that marriage is a keystone of our socialorder. Alexis de Tocqueville recognized this truth on his travelsthrough the United States almost two centuries ago:"There is certainly no country in the world where the tie ofmarriage is so much respected as in America . . . [W]hen theAmerican retires from the turmoil of public life to the bosom ofhis family, he finds in it the image of order and of peace . . . .[H]e afterwards carries [that image] with him into public affairs."1 Democracy in America 309 (H. Reeve transl., rev. ed. 1990).In Maynardv. Hill, 125 U. S. 190, 211 (1888) , theCourt echoed de Tocqueville, explaining that marriage is "thefoundation of the family and of society, without which there wouldbe neither civilization nor progress." Marriage, theMaynard Court said, has long been " 'a great publicinstitution, giving character to our whole civil polity.' "Id., at 213. This idea has been reiterated even as theinstitution has evolved in substantial ways over time, supersedingrules related to parental consent, gender, and race once thought bymany to be essential. See generally N. Cott, Public Vows. Marriageremains a building block of our national community.For that reason, just as a couple vows to support each other, sodoes society pledge to support the couple, offering symbolicrecognition and material benefits to protect and nourish the union.Indeed, while the States are in general free to vary the benefitsthey confer on all married couples, they have throughout ourhistory made marriage the basis for an expanding list ofgovernmental rights, benefits, and responsibilities. These aspectsof marital status include: taxation; inheritance and propertyrights; rules of intestate succession; spousal privilege in the lawof evidence; hospital access; medical decisionmaking authority;adoption rights; the rights and benefits of survivors; birth anddeath certificates; professional ethics rules; campaign financerestrictions; workers' compensation benefits; health insurance; andchild custody, support, and visitation rules. See Brief for UnitedStates as Amicus Curiae 6 9; Brief for American BarAssociation as Amicus Curiae 8 29. Valid marriage understate law is also a significant status for over a thousandprovisions of federal law. See Windsor, 570 U. S., at ______ (slip op., at 15 16). The States have contributed to thefundamental character of the marriage right by placing thatinstitution at the center of so many facets of the legal and socialorder.There is no difference between same- and opposite-sex coupleswith respect to this principle. Yet by virtue of their exclusionfrom that institution, same-sex couples are denied theconstellation of benefits that the States have linked to marriage.This harm results in more than just material burdens. Same-sexcouples are consigned to an instability many opposite-sex coupleswould deem intolerable in their own lives. As the State itselfmakes marriage all the more precious by the significance itattaches to it, exclusion from that status has the effect ofteaching that gays and lesbians are unequal in important respects.It demeans gays and lesbians for the State to lock them out of acentral institution of the Nation's society. Same-sex couples, too,may aspire to the transcendent purposes of marriage and seekfulfillment in its highest meaning.The limitation of marriage to opposite-sex couples may long haveseemed natural and just, but its inconsistency with the centralmeaning of the fundamental right to marry is now manifest. Withthat knowledge must come the recognition that laws excludingsame-sex couples from the marriage right impose stigma and injuryof the kind prohibited by our basic charter.Objecting that this does not reflect an appropriate framing ofthe issue, the respondents refer to Washingtonv.Glucksberg, 521 U. S. 702, 721 (1997) , which called for a "'careful description' " of fundamental rights. They assert thepetitioners do not seek to exercise the right to marry but rather anew and nonexistent "right to same-sex marriage." Brief forRespondent in No. 14 556, p. 8. Glucksberg did insist thatliberty under the Due Process Clause must be defined in a mostcirc*mscribed manner, with central reference to specific historicalpractices. Yet while that approach may have been appropriate forthe asserted right there involved (physician-assisted suicide), itis inconsistent with the approach this Court has used in discussingother fundamental rights, including marriage and intimacy.Loving did not ask about a "right to interracialmarriage"; Turner did not ask about a "right of inmates tomarry"; and Zablocki did not ask about a "right of fatherswith unpaid child support duties to marry." Rather, each caseinquired about the right to marry in its comprehensive sense,asking if there was a sufficient justification for excluding therelevant class from the right. See also Glucksberg, 521 U.S., at 752 773 (Souter, J., concurring in judgment); id.,at 789 792 (Breyer, J., concurring in judgments).That principle applies here. If rights were defined by whoexercised them in the past, then received practices could serve astheir own continued justification and new groups could not invokerights once denied. This Court has rejected that approach, bothwith respect to the right to marry and the rights of gays andlesbians. See Loving 388 U. S., at 12; Lawrence,539 U. S., at 566 567.The right to marry is fundamental as a matter of history andtradition, but rights come not from ancient sources alone. Theyrise, too, from a better informed understanding of howconstitutional imperatives define a liberty that remains urgent inour own era. Many who deem same-sex marriage to be wrong reach thatconclusion based on decent and honorable religious or philosophicalpremises, and neither they nor their beliefs are disparaged here.But when that sincere, personal opposition becomes enacted law andpublic policy, the necessary consequence is to put the imprimaturof the State itself on an exclusion that soon demeans orstigmatizes those whose own liberty is then denied. Under theConstitution, same-sex couples seek in marriage the same legaltreatment as opposite-sex couples, and it would disparage theirchoices and diminish their personhood to deny them this right.The right of same-sex couples to marry that is part of theliberty promised by the Fourteenth Amendment is derived, too, fromthat Amendment's guarantee of the equal protection of the laws. TheDue Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause are connected ina profound way, though they set forth independent principles.Rights implicit in liberty and rights secured by equal protectionmay rest on different precepts and are not always co-extensive, yetin some instances each may be instructive as to the meaning andreach of the other. In any particular case one Clause may bethought to capture the essence of the right in a more accurate andcomprehensive way, even as the two Clauses may converge in theidentification and definition of the right. See M. L. B.,519 U. S., at 120 121; id., at 128 129 (Kennedy, J.,concurring in judgment); Beardenv. Georgia, 461 U. S. 660,665 (1983) . This interrelation of the two principles furthers ourunderstanding of what freedom is and must become.The Court's cases touching upon the right to marry reflect thisdynamic. In Loving the Court invalidated a prohibition oninterracial marriage under both the Equal Protection Clause and theDue Process Clause. The Court first declared the prohibitioninvalid because of its un-equal treatment of interracial couples.It stated: "There can be no doubt that restricting the freedom tomarry solely because of racial classifications violates the centralmeaning of the Equal Protection Clause." 388 U. S., at 12. Withthis link to equal protection the Court proceeded to hold theprohibition offended central precepts of liberty: "To deny thisfundamental freedom on so unsupportable a basis as the racialclassifications embodied in these statutes, classifications sodirectly subversive of the principle of equality at the heart ofthe Fourteenth Amendment, is surely to deprive all the State'scitizens of liberty without due process of law." Ibid. Thereasons why marriage is a fundamental right became more clear andcompelling from a full awareness and understanding of the hurt thatresulted from laws barring interracial unions.The synergy between the two protections is illustrated furtherin Zablocki. There the Court invoked the Equal ProtectionClause as its basis for invalidating the challenged law, which, asalready noted, barred fathers who were behind on child-supportpayments from marrying without judicial approval. The equalprotection analysis depended in central part on the Court's holdingthat the law burdened a right "of fundamental importance." 434 U.S., at 383. It was the essential nature of the marriage right,discussed at length in Zablocki, see id., at 383387, that made apparent the law's incompatibility with requirementsof equality. Each concept liberty and equal protection leads to astronger understanding of the other.Indeed, in interpreting the Equal Protection Clause, the Courthas recognized that new insights and societal understandings canreveal unjustified inequality within our most fundamentalinstitutions that once passed unnoticed and unchallenged. To takebut one period, this occurred with respect to marriage in the1970's and 1980's. Notwithstanding the gradual erosion of thedoctrine of coverture, see supra, at 6, invidioussex-based classifications in marriage remained common through themid-20th century. See App. to Brief for Appellant in Reedv.Reed, O. T. 1971, No. 70 4, pp. 69 88 (an extensive referenceto laws extant as of 1971 treating women as unequal to men inmarriage). These classifications denied the equal dignity of menand women. One State's law, for example, provided in 1971 that "thehusband is the head of the family and the wife is subject to him;her legal civil existence is merged in the husband, except so faras the law recognizes her separately, either for her ownprotection, or for her benefit." Ga. Code Ann. 53 501 (1935).Responding to a new awareness, the Court invoked equal protectionprinciples to invalidate laws imposing sex-based inequality onmarriage. See, e.g., Kirchbergv. Feenstra, 450 U. S. 455(1981) ; Wenglerv. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U. S. 142(1980) ; Califanov. Westcott, 443 U. S. 76 (1979) ;Orrv. Orr, 440 U. S. 268 (1979) ; Califanov.Goldfarb, 430 U. S. 199 (1977) (plurality opinion);Weinbergerv. Wiesenfeld, 420 U. S. 636 (1975) ;Frontierov. Richardson, 411 U. S. 677 (1973) . LikeLoving and Zablocki, these precedents show theEqual Protection Clause can help to identify and correctinequalities in the institution of marriage, vindicating preceptsof liberty and equality under the Constitution.Other cases confirm this relation between liberty and equality.In M. L. B.v. S. L. J., the Court invalidated under dueprocess and equal protection principles a statute requiringindigent mothers to pay a fee in order to appeal the termination oftheir parental rights. See 519 U. S., at 119 124. InEisenstadtv. Baird, the Court invoked both principles toinvalidate a prohibition on the distribution of contraceptives tounmarried persons but not married persons. See 405 U. S., at 446454. And in Skinnerv. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, theCourt invalidated under both principles a law that allowedsterilization of habitual criminals. See 316 U. S., at 538 543.In Lawrence the Court acknowledged the interlockingnature of these constitutional safeguards in the context of thelegal treatment of gays and lesbians. See 539 U. S., at 575.Although Lawrence elaborated its holding under the DueProcess Clause, it acknowledged, and sought to remedy, thecontinuing inequality that resulted from laws making intimacy inthe lives of gays and lesbians a crime against the State. Seeibid. Lawrence therefore drew upon principles ofliberty and equality to define and protect the rights of gays andlesbians, holding the State "cannot demean their existence orcontrol their destiny by making their private sexual conduct acrime." Id., at 578.This dynamic also applies to same-sex marriage. It is now clearthat the challenged laws burden the liberty of same-sex couples,and it must be further acknowledged that they abridge centralprecepts of equality. Here the marriage laws enforced by therespondents are in essence unequal: same-sex couples are denied allthe benefits afforded to opposite-sex couples and are barred fromexercising a fundamental right. Especially against a long historyof disapproval of their relationships, this denial to same-sexcouples of the right to marry works a grave and continuing harm.The imposition of this disability on gays and lesbians serves todisrespect and subordinate them. And the Equal Protection Clause,like the Due Process Clause, prohibits this unjustifiedinfringement of the fundamental right to marry. See, e.g.,Zablocki, supra, at 383 388; Skinner,316 U. S., at 541.These considerations lead to the conclusion that the right tomarry is a fundamental right inherent in the liberty of the person,and under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of theFourteenth Amendment couples of the same-sex may not be deprived ofthat right and that liberty. The Court now holds that same-sexcouples may exercise the fundamental right to marry. No longer maythis liberty be denied to them. Bakerv. Nelson must be andnow is overruled, and the State laws challenged by Petitioners inthese cases are now held invalid to the extent they excludesame-sex couples from civil marriage on the same terms andconditions as opposite-sex couples.IVThere may be an initial inclination in these cases to proceedwith caution to await further legislation, litigation, and debate.The respondents warn there has been insufficient democraticdiscourse before deciding an issue so basic as the definition ofmarriage. In its ruling on the cases now before this Court, themajority opinion for the Court of Appeals made a cogent argumentthat it would be appropriate for the respondents' States to awaitfurther public discussion and political measures before licensingsame-sex marriages. See DeBoer, 772 F. 3d, at 409.Yet there has been far more deliberation than this argumentacknowledges. There have been referenda, legislative debates, andgrassroots campaigns, as well as countless studies, papers, books,and other popular and scholarly writings. There has been extensivelitigation in state and federal courts. See Appendix A,infra. Judicial opinions addressing the issue have beeninformed by the contentions of parties and counsel, which, in turn,reflect the more general, societal discussion of same-sex marriageand its meaning that has occurred over the past decades. As morethan 100 amici make clear in their filings, many of thecentral institutions in American life state and local governments,the military, large and small businesses, labor unions, religiousorganizations, law enforcement, civic groups, professionalorganizations, and universities have devoted substantial attentionto the question. This has led to an enhanced understanding of theissue an understanding reflected in the arguments now presented forresolution as a matter of constitutional law.Of course, the Constitution contemplates that democracy is theappropriate process for change, so long as that process does notabridge fundamental rights. Last Term, a plurality of this Courtreaffirmed the importance of the democratic principle inSchuettev. BAMN, 572 U. S. ___ (2014), noting the "rightof citizens to debate so they can learn and decide and then,through the political process, act in concert to try to shape thecourse of their own times." Id., at ___ ___ (slip op., at15 16). Indeed, it is most often through democracy that liberty ispreserved and protected in our lives. But as Schuette alsosaid, "[t]he freedom secured by the Constitution consists, in oneof its essential dimensions, of the right of the individual not tobe injured by the unlawful exercise of governmental power."Id., at ___ (slip op., at 15). Thus, when the rights ofpersons are violated, "the Constitution requires redress by thecourts," notwithstanding the more general value of democraticdecisionmaking. Id., at ___ (slip op., at 17). This holdstrue even when protecting individual rights affects issues of theutmost importance and sensitivity.The dynamic of our constitutional system is that individualsneed not await legislative action before asserting a fundamentalright. The Nation's courts are open to injured individuals who cometo them to vindicate their own direct, personal stake in our basiccharter. An individual can invoke a right to constitutionalprotection when he or she is harmed, even if the broader publicdisagrees and even if the legislature refuses to act. The idea ofthe Constitution "was to withdraw certain subjects from thevicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond thereach of majorities and officials and to establish them as legalprinciples to be applied by the courts." West Virginia Bd. ofEd.v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624, 638 (1943) . This is why"fundamental rights may not be submitted to a vote; they depend onthe outcome of no elections." Ibid. It is of no momentwhether advocates of same-sex marriage now enjoy or lack momentumin the democratic process. The issue before the Court here is thelegal question whether the Constitution protects the right ofsame-sex couples to marry.This is not the first time the Court has been asked to adopt acautious approach to recognizing and protecting fundamental rights.In Bowers, a bare majority upheld a law criminalizingsame-sex intimacy. See 478 U. S., at 186, 190 195. That approachmight have been viewed as a cautious endorsem*nt of the democraticprocess, which had only just begun to consider the rights of gaysand lesbians. Yet, in effect, Bowers upheld state actionthat denied gays and lesbians a fundamental right and caused thempain and humiliation. As evidenced by the dissents in that case,the facts and principles necessary to a correct holding were knownto the Bowers Court. See id., at 199 (Blackmun,J., joined by Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens, JJ., dissenting);id., at 214 (Stevens, J., joined by Brennan and Marshall,JJ., dissenting). That is why Lawrence heldBowers was "not correct when it was decided." 539 U. S.,at 578. Although Bowers was eventually repudiated inLawrence, men and women were harmed in the interim, andthe substantial effects of these injuries no doubt lingered longafter Bowers was overruled. Dignitary wounds cannot alwaysbe healed with the stroke of a pen.A ruling against same-sex couples would have the same effectand, like Bowers, would be unjustified under theFourteenth Amendment. The petitioners' stories make clear theurgency of the issue they present to the Court. James Obergefellnow asks whether Ohio can erase his marriage to John Arthur for alltime. April DeBoer and Jayne Rowse now ask whether Michigan maycontinue to deny them the certainty and stability all mothersdesire to protect their children, and for them and their childrenthe childhood years will pass all too soon. Ijpe DeKoe and ThomasKostura now ask whether Tennessee can deny to one who has servedthis Nation the basic dignity of recognizing his New York marriage.Properly presented with the petitioners' cases, the Court has aduty to address these claims and answer these questions.Indeed, faced with a disagreement among the Courts of Appeals adisagreement that caused impermissible geographic variation in themeaning of federal law the Court granted review to determinewhether same-sex couples may exercise the right to marry. Were theCourt to uphold the challenged laws as constitutional, it wouldteach the Nation that these laws are in accord with our society'smost basic compact. Were the Court to stay its hand to allowslower, case-by-case determination of the required availability ofspecific public benefits to same-sex couples, it still would denygays and lesbians many rights and responsibilities intertwined withmarriage.The respondents also argue allowing same-sex couples to wed willharm marriage as an institution by leading to fewer opposite-sexmarriages. This may occur, the respondents contend, becauselicensing same-sex marriage severs the connection between naturalprocreation and marriage. That argument, however, rests on acounterintuitive view of opposite-sex couple's decisionmakingprocesses regarding marriage and parenthood. Decisions aboutwhether to marry and raise children are based on many personal,romantic, and practical considerations; and it is unrealistic toconclude that an opposite-sex couple would choose not to marrysimply because same-sex couples may do so. See Kitchenv.Herbert, 755 F. 3d 1193, 1223 (CA1Add hyphens betweendigits014) ("[I]t is wholly illogical to believe that staterecognition of the love and commitment between same-sex coupleswill alter the most intimate and personal decisions of opposite-sexcouples"). The respondents have not shown a foundation for theconclusion that allowing same-sex marriage will cause the harmfuloutcomes they describe. Indeed, with respect to this asserted basisfor excluding same-sex couples from the right to marry, it isappropriate to observe these cases involve only the rights of twoconsenting adults whose marriages would pose no risk of harm tothemselves or third parties.Finally, it must be emphasized that religions, and those whoadhere to religious doctrines, may continue to advocate withutmost, sincere conviction that, by divine precepts, same-sexmarriage should not be condoned. The First Amendment ensures thatreligious organizations and persons are given proper protection asthey seek to teach the principles that are so fulfilling and socentral to their lives and faiths, and to their own deepaspirations to continue the family structure they have longrevered. The same is true of those who oppose same-sex marriage forother reasons. In turn, those who believe allowing same-sexmarriage is proper or indeed essential, whether as a matter ofreligious conviction or secular belief, may engage those whodisagree with their view in an open and searching debate. TheConstitution, however, does not permit the State to bar same-sexcouples from marriage on the same terms as accorded to couples ofthe opposite sex.VThese cases also present the question whether the Constitutionrequires States to recognize same-sex marriages validly performedout of State. As made clear by the case of Obergefell and Arthur,and by that of DeKoe and Kostura, the recognition bans inflictsubstantial and continuing harm on same-sex couples.Being married in one State but having that valid marriage deniedin another is one of "the most perplexing and distressingcomplication[s]" in the law of domestic relations. Williamsv.North Carolina, 317 U. S. 287, 299 (1942) (internal quotationmarks omitted). Leaving the current state of affairs in place wouldmaintain and promote instability and uncertainty. For some couples,even an ordinary drive into a neighboring State to visit family orfriends risks causing severe hardship in the event of a spouse'shospitalization while across state lines. In light of the fact thatmany States already allow same-sex marriage and hundreds ofthousands of these marriages already have occurred the disruptioncaused by the recognition bans is significant and ever-growing.As counsel for the respondents acknowledged at argument, ifStates are required by the Constitution to issue marriage licensesto same-sex couples, the justifications for refusing to recognizethose marriages performed elsewhere are undermined. See Tr. of OralArg. on Question 2, p. 44. The Court, in this decision, holdssame-sex couples may exercise the fundamental right to marry in allStates. It follows that the Court also must hold and it now doeshold that there is no lawful basis for a State to refuse torecognize a lawful same-sex marriage performed in another State onthe ground of its same-sex character.* * *No union is more profound than marriage, for it embodies thehighest ideals of love, fidelity, devotion, sacrifice, and family.In forming a marital union, two people become something greaterthan once they were. As some of the petitioners in these casesdemonstrate, marriage embodies a love that may endure even pastdeath. It would misunderstand these men and women to say theydisrespect the idea of marriage. Their plea is that they do respectit, respect it so deeply that they seek to find its fulfillment forthemselves. Their hope is not to be condemned to live inloneliness, excluded from one of civilization's oldestinstitutions. They ask for equal dignity in the eyes of the law.The Constitution grants them that right.The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit isreversed.It is so ordered.APPENDICESAState and Federal Judicial DecisionsAddressing Same-Sex MarriageUnited States Courts of Appeals DecisionsAdamsv. Howerton, 673 F. 2d 1036 (CAAdd hyphens betweendigits982)Smeltv. County of Orange, 447 F. 3d 673 (CAAdd hyphensbetween digits006)Citizens for Equal Protectionv. Bruning, 455 F. 3d 859(CAAdd hyphens between digits006)Windsorv. United States, 699 F. 3d 169 (CAAdd hyphensbetween digits012)Massachusettsv. Department of Health and HumanServices, 682 F. 3d 1 (CAAdd hyphens between digits012)Perryv. Brown, 671 F. 3d 1052 (CAAdd hyphens betweendigits012)Lattav. Otter, 771 F. 3d 456 (CAAdd hyphens betweendigits014)Baskinv. Bogan, 766 F. 3d 648 (CAAdd hyphens betweendigits014)Bishopv. Smith, 760 F. 3d 1070 (CA1Add hyphens betweendigits014)Bosticv. Schaefer, 760 F. 3d 352 (CAAdd hyphens betweendigits014)Kitchenv. Herbert, 755 F. 3d 1193 (CA1Add hyphensbetween digits014)DeBoerv. Snyder, 772 F. 3d 388 (CAAdd hyphens betweendigits014)Lattav. Otter, 779 F. 3d 902 (CAAdd hyphens betweendigits015) (O'Scannlain, J., dissenting from the denial ofrehearing en banc)United States District Court DecisionsAdamsv. Howerton, 486 F. Supp. 1119 (CD Cal.1980)Citizens for Equal Protection, Inc.v. Bruning, 290 F.Supp. 2d 1004 (Neb. 2003)Citizens for Equal Protectionv. Bruning, 368 F. Supp.2d 980 (Neb. 2005)Wilsonv. Ake, 354 F. Supp. 2d 1298 (MD Fla.2005)Smeltv. County of Orange, 374 F. Supp. 2d 861 (CD Cal.2005)Bishopv. Oklahoma ex rel. Edmondson, 447 F. Supp. 2d1239 (ND Okla. 2006)Massachusettsv. Department of Health and HumanServices, 698 F. Supp. 2d 234 (Mass. 2010)Gillv. Office of Personnel Management, 699 F. Supp. 2d374 (Mass. 2010)Perryv. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (NDCal. 2010)Dragovichv. Department of Treasury, 764 F.Supp. 2d 1178 (ND Cal. 2011)Golinski v. Office of Personnel Management,824 F. Supp. 2d 968 (ND Cal. 2012)Dragovichv. Department of Treasury, 872 F. Supp. 2d 944(ND Cal. 2012)Windsorv. United States, 833 F. Supp. 2d 394 (SDNY2012)Pedersenv. Office of Personnel Management, 881 F. Supp.2d 294 (Conn. 2012)Jacksonv. Abercrombie, 884 F. Supp. 2d 1065 (Haw.2012)Sevcikv. Sandoval, 911 F. Supp. 2d 996 (Nev. 2012)Merrittv. Attorney General, 2013 WL 6044329 (MDLa., Nov. 14, 2013)Grayv. Orr, 4 F. Supp. 3d 984 (ND Ill.2013)Leev. Orr, 2013 WL 6490577 (ND Ill., Dec. 10, 2013)Kitchenv. Herbert, 961 F. Supp. 2d 1181 (Utah 2013)Obergefellv. Wymyslo, 962 F. Supp. 2d 968 (SD Ohio2013)Bishopv. United States ex rel. Holder, 962 F. Supp. 2d1252 (ND Okla. 2014)Bourkev. Beshear, 996 F. Supp. 2d 542 (WD Ky. 2014)Leev. Orr, 2014 WL 683680 (ND Ill., Feb. 21, 2014)Bosticv. Rainey, 970 F. Supp. 2d 456 (ED Va. 2014)De Leonv. Perry, 975 F. Supp. 2d 632 (WD Tex.2014)Tancov. Haslam, 7 F. Supp. 3d 759 (MD Tenn. 2014)DeBoerv. Snyder, 973 F. Supp. 2d 757 (ED Mich.2014)Henryv. Himes, 14 F. Supp. 3d 1036 (SD Ohio 2014)Lattav. Otter, 19 F. Supp. 3d 1054 (Idaho 2014)Geigerv. Kitzhaber, 994 F. Supp. 2d 1128 (Ore.2014)Evansv. Utah, 21 F. Supp. 3d 1192 (Utah 2014)Whitewoodv. Wolf, 992 F. Supp. 2d 410 (MD Pa. 2014)Wolfv. Walker, 986 F. Supp. 2d 982 (WD Wis. 2014)Baskinv. Bogan, 12 F. Supp. 3d 1144 (SD Ind. 2014)Lovev. Beshear, 989 F. Supp. 2d 536 (WD Ky. 2014)Burnsv. Hickenlooper, 2014 WL 3634834 (Colo., July 23,2014)Bowlingv. Pence, 39 F. Supp. 3d 1025 (SD Ind. 2014)Brennerv. Scott, 999 F. Supp. 2d 1278 (ND Fla.2014)Robicheauxv. Caldwell, 2 F. Supp. 3d 910 (ED La.2014)General Synod of the United Church of Christv.Resinger, 12 F. Supp. 3d 790 (WDNC 2014)Hambyv. Parnell, 56 F. Supp. 3d 1056 (Alaska 2014)Fisher-Bornev. Smith, 14 F. Supp. 3d 695 (MDNC2014)Majorsv. Horne, 14 F. Supp. 3d 1313 (Ariz. 2014)Connollyv. Jeanes, ___ F. Supp. 3d ___, 2014 WL 5320642(Ariz., Oct. 17, 2014)Guzzov. Mead, 2014 WL 5317797 (Wyo., Oct. 17, 2014)Conde-Vidalv. Garcia-Padilla, 54 F. Supp. 3d 157 (PR2014)Mariev. Moser, ___ F. Supp. 3d ___, 2014 WL 5598128(Kan., Nov. 4, 2014)Lawsonv. Kelly, 58 F. Supp. 3d 923 (WD Mo. 2014)McGeev. Cole, ___ F. Supp. 3d ___, 2014 WL 5802665 (SDW. Va., Nov. 7, 2014)Condonv. Haley, 21 F. Supp. 3d 572 (S. C. 2014)Bradacsv. Haley, 58 F. Supp. 3d 514 (S. C. 2014)Rolandov. Fox, 23 F. Supp. 3d 1227 (Mont. 2014)Jerniganv. Crane, ___ F. Supp. 3d ___, 2014 WL 6685391(ED Ark., Nov. 25, 2014)Campaign for Southern Equalityv. Bryant, ___ F. Supp.3d ___, 2014 WL 6680570 (SD Miss., Nov. 25, 2014)Innissv. Aderhold, ___ F. Supp. 3d ___, 2015 WL 300593(ND Ga., Jan. 8, 2015)Rosenbrahnv. Daugaard, 61 F. Supp. 3d 862 (S. D.,2015)Casparv. Snyder, ___ F. Supp. 3d ___, 2015 WL 224741(ED Mich., Jan. 15, 2015)Searceyv. Strange, 2015 U. S. Dist. LEXIS 7776 (SDAla., Jan. 23, 2015)Strawserv. Strange, 44 F. Supp. 3d 1206 (SD Ala.2015)Watersv. Ricketts, 48 F. Supp. 3d 1271 (Neb. 2015)State Highest Court DecisionsBakerv. Nelson, 291 Minn. 310, 191 N. W. 2d 185(1971)Jonesv. Hallahan, 501 S. W. 2d 588 (Ky. 1973)Baehrv. Lewin, 74 Haw. 530, 852 P. 2d 44 (1993)Deanv. District of Columbia, 653 A. 2d 307 (D. C.1995)Bakerv. State, 170 Vt. 194, 744 A. 2d 864 (1999)Brausev. State, 21 P. 3d 357 (Alaska 2001)(ripeness)Goodridgev. Department of Public Health, 440Mass. 309, 798 N. E. 2d 941 (2003)In re Opinions of the Justices to the Senate,440 Mass. 1201, 802 N. E. 2d 565 (2004)Liv. State, 338 Or. 376, 110 P. 3d 91 (2005)Cote-Whitacrev. Department of Public Health,446 Mass.350, 844 N. E. 2d 623 (2006)Lewisv. Harris, 188 N. J. 415, 908 A. 2d 196 (2006)Andersenv. King County, 158 Wash. 2d 1, 138 P. 3d 963(2006)Hernandezv. Robles, 7 N. Y. 3d 338, 855 N. E. 2d 1(2006)Conawayv. Deane, 401 Md. 219, 932 A. 2d 571 (2007)In re Marriage Cases, 43 Cal. 4th 757, 183 P. 3d 384(2008)Kerriganv. Commissioner of Public Health, 289 Conn.135, 957 A. 2d 407 (2008)Straussv. Horton, 46 Cal. 4th 364, 207 P. 3d 48(2009)Varnumv. Brien, 763 N. W. 2d 862 (Iowa 2009)Griegov. Oliver, 2014 NMSC 003, ___ N. M. ___, 316 P.3d 865 (2013)Garden State Equalityv. Dow, 216 N. J. 314, 79 A. 3d1036 (2013)Ex parte State ex rel. Alabama Policy Institute, ___So. 3d ___, 2015 WL 892752 (Ala., Mar. 3, 2015)BState Legislation and Judicial DecisionsLegalizing Same-Sex MarriageLegislationDel. Code Ann., Tit. 13, 129 (Cum. Supp. 2014)D. C. Act No. 18 248, 57 D. C. Reg. 27 (2010)Haw. Rev. Stat. 572 1 (2006) and 2013 Cum. Supp.)Ill. Pub. Act No. 98 597Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 19, 650 A (Cum. Supp. 2014)2012 Md. Laws p. 92013 Minn Laws p. 4042009 N. H. Laws p. 602011 N. Y Laws p. 7492013 R. I. Laws p. 72009 Vt. Acts & Resolves p. 332012 Wash. Sess. Laws p. 199Judicial DecisionsGoodridgev. Department of Public Health, 440 Mass. 309,798 N. E. 2d 941 (2003)Kerriganv. Commissioner of Public Health, 289 Conn.135, 957 A. 2d 407 (2008)Varnumv. Brien, 763 N. W. 2d 862 (Iowa 2009)Griegov. Oliver, 2014 NMSC 003, ___ N. M. ___, 316 P.3d 865 (2013)Garden State Equalityv. Dow, 216 N. J. 314, 79 A. 3d1036 (2013)

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES_________________Nos. 14–556, 14-562, 14-571 and 14–574_________________JAMES OBERGEFELL, etal.,PETITIONERS14–556v.RICHARD HODGES, DIRECTOR, OHIODEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, etal.;VALERIA TANCO, etal.,PETITIONERS14–562v.BILL HASLAM, GOVERNOR OF TENNESSEE,etal.;APRIL DeBOER, etal.,PETITIONERS14–571v.RICK SNYDER, GOVERNOR OF MICHIGAN,etal.; ANDGREGORY BOURKE, etal.,PETITIONERS14–574v.STEVE BESHEAR, GOVERNOR OF KENTUCKYon writs of certiorari to the united statescourt of appeals for the sixth circuit[June 26, 2015]Chief Justice Roberts, with whom JusticeScalia and Justice Thomas join, dissenting.Petitioners make strong arguments rooted insocial policy and considerations of fairness. They contend thatsame-sex couples should be allowed to affirm their love andcommitment through marriage, just like opposite-sex couples. Thatposition has undeniable appeal; over the past six years, voters andlegislators in eleven States and the District of Columbia haverevised their laws to allow marriage between two people of the samesex.But this Court is not a legislature. Whethersame-sex marriage is a good idea should be of no concern to us.Under the Constitution, judges have power to say what the law is,not what it should be. The people who ratified the Constitutionauthorized courts to exercise “neither force nor will but merelyjudgment.” The Federalist No. 78, p. 465 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (A.Hamilton) (capitalization altered).Although the policy arguments for extendingmarriage to same-sex couples may be compelling, the legal argumentsfor requiring such an extension are not. The fundamental right tomarry does not include a right to make a State change itsdefinition of marriage. And a State’s decision to maintain themeaning of marriage that has persisted in every culture throughouthuman history can hardly be called irrational. In short, ourConstitution does not enact any one theory of marriage. The peopleof a State are free to expand marriage to include same-sex couples,or to retain the historic definition.Today, however, the Court takes theextraordinary step of ordering every State to license and recognizesame-sex marriage. Many people will rejoice at this decision, and Ibegrudge none their celebration. But for those who believe in agovernment of laws, not of men, the majority’s approach is deeplydisheartening. Supporters of same-sex marriage have achievedconsiderable success persuading their fellow citizens—through thedemocratic process—to adopt their view. That ends today. Fivelawyers have closed the debate and enacted their own vision ofmarriage as a matter of constitutional law. Stealing this issuefrom the people will for many cast a cloud over same-sex marriage,making a dramatic social change that much more difficult toaccept.The majority’s decision is an act of will, notlegal judgment. The right it announces has no basis in theConstitution or this Court’s precedent. The majority expresslydisclaims judicial “caution” and omits even a pretense of humility,openly relying on its desire to remake society according to its own“new insight” into the “nature of injustice.” Ante, at 11,23. As a result, the Court invalidates the marriage laws ofmore than half the States and orders the transformation of a socialinstitution that has formed the basis of human society formillennia, for the Kalahari Bushmen and the Han Chinese, theCarthaginians and the Aztecs. Just who do we think we are?It can be tempting for judges to confuse our ownpreferences with the requirements of the law. But as this Court hasbeen reminded throughout our history, the Constitution “is made forpeople of fundamentally differing views.” Lochner v. NewYork, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).Accordingly, “courts are not concerned with the wisdom or policy oflegislation.” Id., at 69 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Themajority today neglects that restrained conception of the judicialrole. It seizes for itself a question the Constitution leaves tothe people, at a time when the people are engaged in a vibrantdebate on that question. And it answers that question based not onneutral principles of constitutional law, but on its own“understanding of what freedom is and must become.” Ante, at19. I have no choice but to dissent.Understand well what this dissent is about: Itis not about whether, in my judgment, the institution of marriageshould be changed to include same-sex couples. It is instead aboutwhether, in our democratic republic, that decision should rest withthe people acting through their elected representatives, or withfive lawyers who happen to hold commissions authorizing them toresolve legal disputes according to law. The Constitution leaves nodoubt about the answer.IPetitioners and their amici base theirarguments on the “right to marry” and the imperative of “marriageequality.” There is no serious dispute that, under our precedents,the Constitution protects a right to marry and requires States toapply their marriage laws equally. The real question in these casesis what constitutes “marriage,” or—more precisely—whodecides what constitutes “marriage”?The majority largely ignores these questions,relegating ages of human experience with marriage to a paragraph ortwo. Even if history and precedent are not “the end” of thesecases, ante, at 4, I would not “sweep away what has so longbeen settled” without showing greater respect for all that precededus. Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. ___,___ (2014) (slip op., at 8).AAs the majority acknowledges, marriage “hasexisted for millennia and across civilizations.” Ante, at 3.For all those millennia, across all those civilizations, “marriage”referred to only one relationship: the union of a man and a woman.See ante, at 4; Tr. of Oral Arg. on Question 1, p.12(petitioners conceding that they are not aware of any society thatpermitted same-sex marriage before 2001). As the Court explainedtwo Terms ago, “until recent years, ... marriagebetween a man and a woman no doubt had been thought of by mostpeople as essential to the very definition of that term and to itsrole and function throughout the history of civilization.”United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. ___, ___(2013) (slip op., at 13).This universal definition of marriage as theunion of a man and a woman is no historical coincidence. Marriagedid not come about as a result of a political movement, discovery,disease, war, religious doctrine, or any other moving force ofworld history—and certainly not as a result of a prehistoricdecision to exclude gays and lesbians. It arose in the nature ofthings to meet a vital need: ensuring that children are conceivedby a mother and father committed to raising them in the stableconditions of a lifelong relationship. See G. Quale, A History ofMarriage Systems 2 (1988); cf. M. Cicero, De Officiis 57 (W. Millertransl. 1913) (“For since the reproductive instinct is by nature’sgift the common possession of all living creatures, the first bondof union is that between husband and wife; the next, that betweenparents and children; then we find one home, with everything incommon.”).The premises supporting this concept of marriageare so fundamental that they rarely require articulation. The humanrace must procreate to survive. Procreation occurs through sexualrelations between a man and a woman. When sexual relations resultin the conception of a child, that child’s prospects are generallybetter if the mother and father stay together rather than goingtheir separate ways. Therefore, for the good of children andsociety, sexual relations that can lead to procreation should occuronly between a man and a woman committed to a lasting bond.Society has recognized that bond as marriage.And by bestowing a respected status and material benefits onmarried couples, society encourages men and women to conduct sexualrelations within marriage rather than without. As one prominentscholar put it, “Marriage is a socially arranged solution for theproblem of getting people to stay together and care for childrenthat the mere desire for children, and the sex that makes childrenpossible, does not solve.” J. Q. Wilson, The Marriage Problem 41(2002).This singular understanding of marriage hasprevailed in the United States throughout our history. The majorityaccepts that at “the time of the Nation’s founding [marriage] wasunderstood to be a voluntary contract between a man and a woman.”Ante, at 6. Early Americans drew heavily on legal scholarslike William Blackstone, who regarded marriage between “husband andwife” as one of the “great relations in private life,” andphilosophers like John Locke, who described marriage as “avoluntary compact between man and woman” centered on “its chiefend, procreation” and the “nourishment and support” of children. 1W. Blackstone, Commentaries *410; J. Locke, Second Treatise ofCivil Government §§78–79, p. 39 (J. Gough ed. 1947). To those whodrafted and ratified the Constitution, this conception of marriageand family “was a given: its structure, its stability, roles, andvalues accepted by all.” Forte, The Framers’ Idea of Marriage andFamily, in The Meaning of Marriage 100, 102 (R. George & J.Elshtain eds. 2006).The Constitution itself says nothing aboutmarriage, and the Framers thereby entrusted the States with “[t]hewhole subject of the domestic relations of husband and wife.”Windsor, 570 U.S., at ___ (slip op., at 17) (quotingIn re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586 –594 (1890)). There is nodispute that every State at the founding—and every State throughoutour history until a dozen years ago—defined marriage in thetraditional, biologically rooted way. The four States in thesecases are typical. Their laws, before and after statehood, havetreated marriage as the union of a man and a woman. SeeDeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388, 396–399 (CA62014). Even when state laws did not specify this definitionexpressly, no one doubted what they meant. See Jones v.Hallahan, 501 S.W. 2d 588, 589 (Ky. App. 1973). Themeaning of “marriage” went without saying.Of course, many did say it. In his firstAmerican dictionary, Noah Webster defined marriage as “the legalunion of a man and woman for life,” which served the purposes of“preventing the promiscuous intercourse of the sexes,... promoting domestic felicity, and ...securing the maintenance and education of children.” 1 An AmericanDictionary of the English Language (1828). An influential19th-century treatise defined marriage as “a civil status, existingin one man and one woman legally united for life for those civiland social purposes which are based in the distinction of sex.” J.Bishop, Commentaries on the Law of Marriage and Divorce 25 (1852).The first edition of Black’s Law Dictionary defined marriage as“the civil status of one man and one woman united in law for life.”Black’s Law Dictionary 756 (1891) (emphasis deleted). Thedictionary maintained essentially that same definition for the nextcentury.This Court’s precedents have repeatedlydescribed marriage in ways that are consistent only with itstraditional meaning. Early cases on the subject referred tomarriage as “the union for life of one man and one woman,”Murphy v. Ramsey, 114 U.S. 15, 45 (1885) ,which forms “the foundation of the family and of society, withoutwhich there would be neither civilization nor progress,”Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 211 (1888) . Welater described marriage as “fundamental to our very existence andsurvival,” an understanding that necessarily implies a procreativecomponent. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12(1967) ; see Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson,316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) . More recent cases have directlyconnected the right to marry with the “right to procreate.”Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386 (1978).As the majority notes, some aspects of marriagehave changed over time. Arranged marriages have largely given wayto pairings based on romantic love. States have replaced coverture,the doctrine by which a married man and woman became a single legalentity, with laws that respect each participant’s separate status.Racial restrictions on marriage, which “arose as an incident toslavery” to promote “White Supremacy,” were repealed by many Statesand ultimately struck down by this Court. Loving, 388U.S., at 6–7.The majority observes that these developments“were not mere superficial changes” in marriage, but rather “workeddeep transformations in its structure.” Ante, at 6–7. Theydid not, however, work any transformation in the core structure ofmarriage as the union between a man and a woman. If you had asked aperson on the street how marriage was defined, no one would everhave said, “Marriage is the union of a man and a woman, where thewoman is subject to coverture.” The majority may be right that the“history of marriage is one of both continuity and change,” but thecore meaning of marriage has endured. Ante, at 6.BShortly after this Court struck down racialrestrictions on marriage in Loving, a gay couple inMinnesota sought a marriage license. They argued that theConstitution required States to allow marriage between people ofthe same sex for the same reasons that it requires States to allowmarriage between people of different races. The Minnesota SupremeCourt rejected their analogy to Loving, and this Courtsummarily dismissed an appeal. Baker v. Nelson, 409U.S. 810 (1972) .In the decades after Baker, greaternumbers of gays and lesbians began living openly, and manyexpressed a desire to have their relationships recognized asmarriages. Over time, more people came to see marriage in a waythat could be extended to such couples. Until recently, this newview of marriage remained a minority position. After theMassachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in 2003 interpreted its StateConstitution to require recognition of same-sex marriage, manyStates—including the four at issue here—enacted constitutionalamendments formally adopting the longstanding definition ofmarriage.Over the last few years, public opinion onmarriage has shifted rapidly. In 2009, the legislatures of Vermont,New Hampshire, and the District of Columbia became the first in theNation to enact laws that revised the definition of marriage toinclude same-sex couples, while also providing accommodations forreligious believers. In 2011, the New York Legislature enacted asimilar law. In 2012, voters in Maine did the same, reversing theresult of a referendum just three years earlier in which they hadupheld the traditional definition of marriage.In all, voters and legislators in eleven Statesand the District of Columbia have changed their definitions ofmarriage to include same-sex couples. The highest courts of fiveStates have decreed that same result under their own Constitutions.The remainder of the States retain the traditional definition ofmarriage.Petitioners brought lawsuits contending that theDue Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the FourteenthAmendment compel their States to license and recognize marriagesbetween same-sex couples. In a carefully reasoned decision, theCourt of Appeals acknowledged the democratic “momentum” in favor of“expand[ing] the definition of marriage to include gay couples,”but concluded that petitioners had not made “the case forconstitutionalizing the definition of marriage and for removing theissue from the place it has been since the founding: in the handsof state voters.” 772 F.3d, at 396, 403. That decisioninterpreted the Constitution correctly, and I would affirm.IIPetitioners first contend that the marriagelaws of their States violate the Due Process Clause. The SolicitorGeneral of the United States, appearing in support of petitioners,expressly disowned that position before this Court. See Tr. of OralArg. on Question 1, at 38–39. The majority nevertheless resolvesthese cases for petitioners based almost entirely on the DueProcess Clause.The majority purports to identify four“principles and traditions” in this Court’s due process precedentsthat support a fundamental right for same-sex couples to marry.Ante, at 12. In reality, however, the majority’s approachhas no basis in principle or tradition, except for the unprincipledtradition of judicial policymaking that characterized discrediteddecisions such as Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S.45 . Stripped of its shiny rhetorical gloss, the majority’sargument is that the Due Process Clause gives same-sex couples afundamental right to marry because it will be good for them and forsociety. If I were a legislator, I would certainly consider thatview as a matter of social policy. But as a judge, I find themajority’s position indefensible as a matter of constitutionallaw.APetitioners’ “fundamental right” claim fallsinto the most sensitive category of constitutional adjudication.Petitioners do not contend that their States’ marriage laws violatean enumerated constitutional right, such as the freedom ofspeech protected by the First Amendment. There is, after all, no“Companionship and Understanding” or “Nobility and Dignity” Clausein the Constitution. See ante, at 3, 14. They argue insteadthat the laws violate a right implied by the FourteenthAmendment’s requirement that “liberty” may not be deprived without“due process of law.”This Court has interpreted the Due ProcessClause to include a “substantive” component that protects certainliberty interests against state deprivation “no matter what processis provided.” Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302(1993) . The theory is that some liberties are “so rooted in thetraditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked asfundamental,” and therefore cannot be deprived without compellingjustification. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291U.S. 97, 105 (1934).Allowing unelected federal judges to selectwhich unenumerated rights rank as “fundamental”—and to strike downstate laws on the basis of that determination—raises obviousconcerns about the judicial role. Our precedents have accordinglyinsisted that judges “exercise the utmost care” in identifyingimplied fundamental rights, “lest the liberty protected by the DueProcess Clause be subtly transformed into the policy preferences ofthe Members of this Court.” Washington v. Glucksberg,521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997) (internal quotation marks omitted);see Kennedy, Unenumerated Rights and the Dictates of JudicialRestraint 13 (1986) (Address at Stanford) (“One can conclude thatcertain essential, or fundamental, rights should exist in any justsociety. It does not follow that each of those essential rights isone that we as judges can enforce under the written Constitution.The Due Process Clause is not a guarantee of every right thatshould inhere in an ideal system.”).The need for restraint in administering thestrong medicine of substantive due process is a lesson this Courthas learned the hard way. The Court first applied substantive dueprocess to strike down a statute in Dred Scott v.Sandford, 19 How. 393 (1857). There the Court invalidatedthe Missouri Compromise on the ground that legislation restrictingthe institution of slavery violated the implied rights ofslaveholders. The Court relied on its own conception of liberty andproperty in doing so. It asserted that “an act of Congress whichdeprives a citizen of the United States of his liberty or property,merely because he came himself or brought his property into aparticular Territory of the United States ... couldhardly be dignified with the name of due process of law.”Id., at 450. In a dissent that has outlasted the majorityopinion, Justice Curtis explained that when the “fixed rules whichgovern the interpretation of laws [are] abandoned, and thetheoretical opinions of individuals are allowed to control” theConstitution’s meaning, “we have no longer a Constitution; we areunder the government of individual men, who for the time being havepower to declare what the Constitution is, according to their ownviews of what it ought to mean.” Id., at 621.Dred Scott’s holding was overruled on thebattlefields of the Civil War and by constitutional amendment afterAppomattox, but its approach to the Due Process Clause reappeared.In a series of early 20th-century cases, most prominentlyLochner v. New York, this Court invalidated statestatutes that presented “meddlesome interferences with the rightsof the individual,” and “undue interference with liberty of personand freedom of contract.” 198 U.S., at 60, 61. InLochner itself, the Court struck down a New York law settingmaximum hours for bakery employees, because there was “in ourjudgment, no reasonable foundation for holding this to be necessaryor appropriate as a health law.” Id., at 58.The dissenting Justices in Lochnerexplained that the New York law could be viewed as a reasonableresponse to legislative concern about the health of bakeryemployees, an issue on which there was at least “room for debateand for an honest difference of opinion.” Id., at 72(opinion of Harlan, J.). The majority’s contrary conclusionrequired adopting as constitutional law “an economic theory which alarge part of the country does not entertain.” Id., at 75(opinion of Holmes, J.). As Justice Holmes memorably put it, “TheFourteenth Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer’s SocialStatics,” a leading work on the philosophy of Social Darwinism.Ibid. The Constitution “is not intended to embody aparticular economic theory ... . It is made for peopleof fundamentally differing views, and the accident of our findingcertain opinions natural and familiar or novel and even shockingought not to conclude our judgment upon the question whetherstatutes embodying them conflict with the Constitution.”Id., at 75–76.In the decades after Lochner, the Courtstruck down nearly 200 laws as violations of individual liberty,often over strong dissents contending that “[t]he criterion ofconstitutionality is not whether we believe the law to be for thepublic good.” Adkins v. Children’s Hospital ofD.C., 261 U.S. 525, 570 (1923) (opinion of Holmes,J.). By empowering judges to elevate their own policy judgments tothe status of constitutionally protected “liberty,” theLochner line of cases left “no alternative to regarding thecourt as a ... legislative chamber.” L. Hand, The Billof Rights 42 (1958).Eventually, the Court recognized its error andvowed not to repeat it. “The doctrine that ... dueprocess authorizes courts to hold laws unconstitutional when theybelieve the legislature has acted unwisely,” we later explained,“has long since been discarded. We have returned to the originalconstitutional proposition that courts do not substitute theirsocial and economic beliefs for the judgment of legislative bodies,who are elected to pass laws.” Ferguson v. Skrupa,372 U.S. 726, 730 (1963) ; see Day-Brite Lighting,Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421, 423 (1952) (“we donot sit as a super-legislature to weigh the wisdom oflegislation”). Thus, it has become an accepted rule that the Courtwill not hold laws unconstitutional simply because we find them“unwise, improvident, or out of harmony with a particular school ofthought.” Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc.,348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955) .Rejecting Lochner does not requiredisavowing the doctrine of implied fundamental rights, and thisCourt has not done so. But to avoid repeating Lochner’serror of converting personal preferences into constitutionalmandates, our modern substantive due process cases have stressedthe need for “judicial self-restraint.” Collins v. HarkerHeights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992) . Our precedents haverequired that implied fundamental rights be “objectively, deeplyrooted in this Nation’s history and tradition,” and “implicit inthe concept of ordered liberty, such that neither liberty norjustice would exist if they were sacrificed.” Glucksberg,521 U.S., at 720–721 (internal quotation marks omitted).Although the Court articulated the importance ofhistory and tradition to the fundamental rights inquiry mostprecisely in Glucksberg, many other cases both before andafter have adopted the same approach. See, e.g., DistrictAttorney’s Office for Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne,557 U.S. 52, 72 (2009) ; Flores, 507 U.S., at303; United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739,751 (1987) ; Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S.494, 503 (1977) (plurality opinion); see also id., at 544(White, J., dissenting) (“The Judiciary, including this Court, isthe most vulnerable and comes nearest to illegitimacy when it dealswith judge-made constitutional law having little or no cognizableroots in the language or even the design of the Constitution.”);Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 –101 (2000)(Kennedy, J., dissenting) (consulting “‘[o]ur Nation’shistory, legal traditions, and practices’” and concludingthat “[w]e owe it to the Nation’s domestic relations legalstructure ... to proceed with caution” (quotingGlucksberg, 521 U.S., at 721)).Proper reliance on history and tradition ofcourse requires looking beyond the individual law being challenged,so that every restriction on liberty does not supply its ownconstitutional justification. The Court is right about that.Ante, at 18. But given the few “guideposts for responsibledecisionmaking in this unchartered area,” Collins, 503U.S., at 125, “an approach grounded in history imposes limitson the judiciary that are more meaningful than any based on [an]abstract formula,” Moore, 431 U.S., at 504, n.12(plurality opinion). Expanding a right suddenly and dramatically islikely to require tearing it up from its roots. Even a sincereprofession of “discipline” in identifying fundamental rights,ante, at 10–11, does not provide a meaningful constraint ona judge, for “what he is really likely to be ‘discovering,’ whetheror not he is fully aware of it, are his own values,” J.Ely,Democracy and Distrust 44 (1980). The only way to ensure restraintin this delicate enterprise is “continual insistence upon respectfor the teachings of history, solid recognition of the basic valuesthat underlie our society, and wise appreciation of the great roles[of] the doctrines of federalism and separation of powers.”Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 501(1965) (Harlan, J., concurring in judgment).BThe majority acknowledges none of thisdoctrinal background, and it is easy to see why: Its aggressiveapplication of substantive due process breaks sharply with decadesof precedent and returns the Court to the unprincipled approach ofLochner.1The majority’s driving themes are thatmarriage is desirable and petitioners desire it. The opiniondescribes the “transcendent importance” of marriage and repeatedlyinsists that petitioners do not seek to “demean,” “devalue,”“denigrate,” or “disrespect” the institution. Ante, at 3, 4,6, 28. Nobody disputes those points. Indeed, the compellingpersonal accounts of petitioners and others like them are likely aprimary reason why many Americans have changed their minds aboutwhether same-sex couples should be allowed to marry. As a matter ofconstitutional law, however, the sincerity of petitioners’ wishesis not relevant.When the majority turns to the law, it reliesprimarily on precedents discussing the fundamental “right tomarry.” Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 95(1987) ; Zablocki, 434 U.S., at 383; seeLoving, 388 U.S., at 12. These cases do not hold, ofcourse, that anyone who wants to get married has a constitutionalright to do so. They instead require a State to justify barriers tomarriage as that institution has always been understood. InLoving, the Court held that racial restrictions on the rightto marry lacked a compelling justification. In Zablocki,restrictions based on child support debts did not suffice. InTurner, restrictions based on status as a prisoner weredeemed impermissible.None of the laws at issue in those casespurported to change the core definition of marriage as the union ofa man and a woman. The laws challenged in Zablocki andTurner did not define marriage as “the union of a man and awoman, where neither party owes child support or is inprison.” Nor did the interracial marriage ban at issue inLoving define marriage as “the union of a man and a womanof the same race.” See Tragen, Comment, StatutoryProhibitions Against Interracial Marriage, 32 Cal. L.Rev. 269(1944) (“at common law there was no ban on interracial marriage”);post, at 11–12, n.5 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Removingracial barriers to marriage therefore did not change what amarriage was any more than integrating schools changed what aschool was. As the majority admits, the institution of “marriage”discussed in every one of these cases “presumed a relationshipinvolving opposite-sex partners.” Ante, at 11.In short, the “right to marry” cases stand forthe important but limited proposition that particular restrictionson access to marriage as traditionally defined violate dueprocess. These precedents say nothing at all about a right to makea State change its definition of marriage, which is the rightpetitioners actually seek here. See Windsor, 570 U.S.,at ___ (Alito, J., dissenting) (slip op., at 8) (“What Windsor andthe United States seek ... is not the protection of adeeply rooted right but the recognition of a very new right.”).Neither petitioners nor the majority cites a single case or otherlegal source providing any basis for such a constitutional right.None exists, and that is enough to foreclose their claim.2The majority suggests that “there are other,more instructive precedents” informing the right to marry.Ante, at 12. Although not entirely clear, this referenceseems to correspond to a line of cases discussing an impliedfundamental “right of privacy.” Griswold, 381 U.S., at486. In the first of those cases, the Court invalidated a criminallaw that banned the use of contraceptives. Id., at 485–486.The Court stressed the invasive nature of the ban, which threatenedthe intrusion of “the police to search the sacred precincts ofmarital bedrooms.” Id., at 485. In the Court’s view, suchlaws infringed the right to privacy in its most basic sense: the“right to be let alone.” Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405U.S. 438 –454, n. 10 (1972) (internal quotation marksomitted); see Olmstead v. United States, 277U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).The Court also invoked the right to privacy inLawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) , whichstruck down a Texas statute criminalizing hom*osexual sodomy.Lawrence relied on the position that criminal sodomy laws,like bans on contraceptives, invaded privacy by inviting“unwarranted government intrusions” that “touc[h] upon the mostprivate human conduct, sexual behavior ... in the mostprivate of places, the home.” Id., at 562, 567.Neither Lawrence nor any other precedentin the privacy line of cases supports the right that petitionersassert here. Unlike criminal laws banning contraceptives andsodomy, the marriage laws at issue here involve no governmentintrusion. They create no crime and impose no punishment. Same-sexcouples remain free to live together, to engage in intimateconduct, and to raise their families as they see fit. No one is“condemned to live in loneliness” by the laws challenged in thesecases—no one. Ante, at 28. At the same time, the laws in noway interfere with the “right to be let alone.”The majority also relies on Justice Harlan’sinfluential dissenting opinion in Poe v. Ullman, 367U.S. 497 (1961) . As the majority recounts, that opinionstates that “[d]ue process has not been reduced to any formula.”Id., at 542. But far from conferring the broad interpretivediscretion that the majority discerns, Justice Harlan’s opinionmakes clear that courts implying fundamental rights are not “freeto roam where unguided speculation might take them.” Ibid.They must instead have “regard to what history teaches” andexercise not only “judgment” but “restraint.” Ibid. Ofparticular relevance, Justice Harlan explained that “laws regardingmarriage which provide both when the sexual powers may be used andthe legal and societal context in which children are born andbrought up ... form a pattern so deeply pressed intothe substance of our social life that any Constitutional doctrinein this area must build upon that basis.” Id., at 546.In sum, the privacy cases provide no support forthe majority’s position, because petitioners do not seek privacy.Quite the opposite, they seek public recognition of theirrelationships, along with corresponding government benefits. Ourcases have consistently refused to allow litigants to convert theshield provided by constitutional liberties into a sword to demandpositive entitlements from the State. See DeShaney v.Winnebago County Dept. of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189,196 (1989) ; San Antonio Independent School Dist. v.Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 –37 (1973); post, at 9–13(Thomas, J., dissenting). Thus, although the right to privacyrecognized by our precedents certainly plays a role in protectingthe intimate conduct of same-sex couples, it provides noaffirmative right to redefine marriage and no basis for strikingdown the laws at issue here.3Perhaps recognizing how little support it canderive from precedent, the majority goes out of its way to jettisonthe “careful” approach to implied fundamental rights taken by thisCourt in Glucksberg. Ante, at 18 (quoting 521U.S., at 721). It is revealing that the majority’s positionrequires it to effectively overrule Glucksberg, the leadingmodern case setting the bounds of substantive due process. At leastthis part of the majority opinion has the virtue of candor. Nobodycould rightly accuse the majority of taking a careful approach.Ultimately, only one precedent offers anysupport for the majority’s methodology: Lochner v. NewYork, 198 U.S. 45 . The majority opens its opinion byannouncing petitioners’ right to “define and express theiridentity.” Ante, at 1–2. The majority later explains that“the right to personal choice regarding marriage is inherent in theconcept of individual autonomy.” Ante, at 12. Thisfreewheeling notion of individual autonomy echoes nothing so muchas “the general right of an individual to be free in hisperson and in his power to contract in relation to his ownlabor.” Lochner, 198 U.S., at 58 (emphasis added).To be fair, the majority does not suggest thatit* individual autonomy right is entirely unconstrained. Theconstraints it sets are precisely those that accord with its own“reasoned judgment,” informed by its “new insight” into the “natureof injustice,” which was invisible to all who came before but hasbecome clear “as we learn [the] meaning” of liberty. Ante,at 10, 11. The truth is that today’s decision rests onnothing more than the majority’s own conviction that same-sexcouples should be allowed to marry because they want to, and that“it would disparage their choices and diminish their personhood todeny them this right.” Ante, at 19. Whatever force thatbelief may have as a matter of moral philosophy, it has no morebasis in the Constitution than did the naked policy preferencesadopted in Lochner. See 198 U.S., at 61 (“We do notbelieve in the soundness of the views which uphold this law,” which“is an illegal interference with the rights of individuals... to make contracts regarding labor upon such termsas they may think best”).The majority recognizes that today’s cases donot mark “the first time the Court has been asked to adopt acautious approach to recognizing and protecting fundamentalrights.” Ante, at 25. On that much, we agree. The Court was“asked”—and it agreed—to “adopt a cautious approach” to implyingfundamental rights after the debacle of the Lochner era.Today, the majority casts caution aside and revives the graveerrors of that period.One immediate question invited by the majority’sposition is whether States may retain the definition of marriage asa union of two people. Cf. Brown v. Buhman, 947F.Supp. 2d 1170 (Utah 2013), appeal pending, No. 14-4117(CA10). Although the majority randomly inserts the adjective “two”in various places, it offers no reason at all why the two-personelement of the core definition of marriage may be preserved whilethe man-woman element may not. Indeed, from the standpoint ofhistory and tradition, a leap from opposite-sex marriage tosame-sex marriage is much greater than one from a two-person unionto plural unions, which have deep roots in some cultures around theworld. If the majority is willing to take the big leap, it is hardto see how it can say no to the shorter one.It is striking how much of the majority’sreasoning would apply with equal force to the claim of afundamental right to plural marriage. If “[t]here is dignity in thebond between two men or two women who seek to marry and in theirautonomy to make such profound choices,” ante, at 13, whywould there be any less dignity in the bond between three peoplewho, in exercising their autonomy, seek to make the profound choiceto marry? If a same-sex couple has the constitutional right tomarry because their children would otherwise “suffer the stigma ofknowing their families are somehow lesser,” ante, at 15, whywouldn’t the same reasoning apply to a family of three or morepersons raising children? If not having the opportunity to marry“serves to disrespect and subordinate” gay and lesbian couples, whywouldn’t the same “imposition of this disability,” ante, at22, serve to disrespect and subordinate people who find fulfillmentin polyamorous relationships? See Bennett, Polyamory: The NextSexual Revolution? Newsweek, July 28, 2009 (estimating 500,000polyamorous families in the United States); Li, Married Lesbian“Throuple” Expecting First Child, N.Y. Post, Apr. 23, 2014;Otter, Three May Not Be a Crowd: The Case for a ConstitutionalRight to Plural Marriage, 64 Emory L.J. 1977 (2015).I do not mean to equate marriage betweensame-sex couples with plural marriages in all respects. There maywell be relevant differences that compel different legal analysis.But if there are, petitioners have not pointed to any. When askedabout a plural marital union at oral argument, petitioners assertedthat a State “doesn’t have such an institution.” Tr. of Oral Arg.on Question 2, p. 6. But that is exactly the point: the States atissue here do not have an institution of same-sex marriage,either.4Near the end of its opinion, the majorityoffers perhaps the clearest insight into its decision. Expandingmarriage to include same-sex couples, the majority insists, would“pose no risk of harm to themselves or third parties.” Ante,at 27. This argument again echoes Lochner, which relied onits assessment that “we think that a law like the one before usinvolves neither the safety, the morals nor the welfare of thepublic, and that the interest of the public is not in the slightestdegree affected by such an act.” 198 U.S., at 57.Then and now, this assertion of the “harmprinciple” sounds more in philosophy than law. The elevation of thefullest individual self-realization over the constraints thatsociety has expressed in law may or may not be attractive moralphilosophy. But a Justice’s commission does not confer any specialmoral, philosophical, or social insight sufficient to justifyimposing those perceptions on fellow citizens under the pretense of“due process.” There is indeed a process due the people on issuesof this sort—the democratic process. Respecting that understandingrequires the Court to be guided by law, not any particular schoolof social thought. As Judge Henry Friendly once put it, echoingJustice Holmes’s dissent in Lochner, the FourteenthAmendment does not enact John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty any morethan it enacts Herbert Spencer’s Social Statics. See Randolph,Before Roe v. Wade: Judge Friendly’s Draft AbortionOpinion, 29 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 1035, 1036–1037, 1058(2006). And it certainly does not enact any one concept ofmarriage.The majority’s understanding of due process laysout a tantalizing vision of the future for Members of this Court:If an unvarying social institution enduring over all of recordedhistory cannot inhibit judicial policymaking, what can? But thisapproach is dangerous for the rule of law. The purpose of insistingthat implied fundamental rights have roots in the history andtradition of our people is to ensure that when unelected judgesstrike down democratically enacted laws, they do so based onsomething more than their own beliefs. The Court today not onlyoverlooks our country’s entire history and tradition but activelyrepudiates it, preferring to live only in the heady days of thehere and now. I agree with the majority that the “nature ofinjustice is that we may not always see it in our own times.”Ante, at 11. As petitioners put it, “times can blind.” Tr.of Oral Arg. on Question 1, at 9, 10. But to blind yourself tohistory is both prideful and unwise. “The past is never dead. It’snot even past.” W. Faulkner, Requiem for a Nun 92 (1951).IIIIn addition to their due process argument,petitioners contend that the Equal Protection Clause requires theirStates to license and recognize same-sex marriages. The majoritydoes not seriously engage with this claim. Its discussion is, quitefrankly, difficult to follow. The central point seems to be thatthere is a “synergy between” the Equal Protection Clause and theDue Process Clause, and that some precedents relying on one Clausehave also relied on the other. Ante, at 20. Absent from thisportion of the opinion, however, is anything resembling our usualframework for deciding equal protection cases. It is casebookdoctrine that the “modern Supreme Court’s treatment of equalprotection claims has used a means-ends methodology in which judgesask whether the classification the government is using issufficiently related to the goals it is pursuing.” G. Stone, L.Seidman, C. Sunstein, M. Tushnet, & P. Karlan, ConstitutionalLaw 453 (7th ed. 2013). The majority’s approach today isdifferent:“Rights implicit in liberty and rightssecured by equal protection may rest on different precepts and arenot always co-extensive, yet in some instances each may beinstructive as to the meaning and reach of the other. In anyparticular case one Clause may be thought to capture the essence ofthe right in a more accurate and comprehensive way, even as the twoClauses may converge in the identification and definition of theright.” Ante, at 19.The majority goes on to assert in conclusoryfashion that the Equal Protection Clause provides an alternativebasis for its holding. Ante, at 22. Yet the majority failsto provide even a single sentence explaining how the EqualProtection Clause supplies independent weight for its position, nordoes it attempt to justify its gratuitous violation of the canonagainst unnecessarily resolving constitutional questions. SeeNorthwest Austin Municipal Util. Dist. No. One v.Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 197 (2009) . In any event, themarriage laws at issue here do not violate the Equal ProtectionClause, because distinguishing between opposite-sex and same-sexcouples is rationally related to the States’ “legitimate stateinterest” in “preserving the traditional institution of marriage.”Lawrence, 539 U.S., at 585 (O’Connor, J., concurringin judgment).It is important to note with precision whichlaws petitioners have challenged. Although they discuss some of theancillary legal benefits that accompany marriage, such as hospitalvisitation rights and recognition of spousal status on officialdocuments, petitioners’ lawsuits target the laws defining marriagegenerally rather than those allocating benefits specifically. Theequal protection analysis might be different, in my view, if wewere confronted with a more focused challenge to the denial ofcertain tangible benefits. Of course, those more selective claimswill not arise now that the Court has taken the drastic step ofrequiring every State to license and recognize marriages betweensame-sex couples.IVThe legitimacy of this Court ultimately rests“upon the respect accorded to its judgments.” Republican Partyof Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 793 (2002)(Kennedy, J., concurring). That respect flows from theperception—and reality—that we exercise humility and restraint indeciding cases according to the Constitution and law. The role ofthe Court envisioned by the majority today, however, is anythingbut humble or restrained. Over and over, the majority exalts therole of the judiciary in delivering social change. In themajority’s telling, it is the courts, not the people, who areresponsible for making “new dimensions of freedom ...apparent to new generations,” for providing “formal discourse” onsocial issues, and for ensuring “neutral discussions, withoutscornful or disparaging commentary.” Ante, at 7–9.Nowhere is the majority’s extravagant conceptionof judicial supremacy more evident than in its description—anddismissal—of the public debate regarding same-sex marriage. Yes,the majority concedes, on one side are thousands of years of humanhistory in every society known to have populated the planet. But onthe other side, there has been “extensive litigation,” “manythoughtful District Court decisions,” “countless studies, papers,books, and other popular and scholarly writings,” and “more than100” amicus briefs in these cases alone. Ante, at 9,10, 23. What would be the point of allowing the democratic processto go on? It is high time for the Court to decide the meaning ofmarriage, based on five lawyers’ “better informed understanding” of“a liberty that remains urgent in our own era.” Ante, at 19.The answer is surely there in one of those amicus briefs orstudies.Those who founded our country would notrecognize the majority’s conception of the judicial role. Theyafter all risked their lives and fortunes for the precious right togovern themselves. They would never have imagined yielding thatright on a question of social policy to unaccountable and unelectedjudges. And they certainly would not have been satisfied by asystem empowering judges to override policy judgments so long asthey do so after “a quite extensive discussion.” Ante, at 8.In our democracy, debate about the content of the law is not anexhaustion requirement to be checked off before courts can imposetheir will. “Surely the Constitution does not put either thelegislative branch or the executive branch in the position of atelevision quiz show contestant so that when a given period of timehas elapsed and a problem remains unresolved by them, the federaljudiciary may press a buzzer and take its turn at fashioning asolution.” Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TexasL.Rev. 693, 700 (1976). As a plurality of this Courtexplained just last year, “It is demeaning to the democraticprocess to presume that voters are not capable of deciding an issueof this sensitivity on decent and rational grounds.”Schuette v. BAMN, 572 U.S. ___, ___ –___ (2014)(slip op., at 16–17).The Court’s accumulation of power does not occurin a vacuum. It comes at the expense of the people. And they knowit. Here and abroad, people are in the midst of a serious andthoughtful public debate on the issue of same-sex marriage. Theysee voters carefully considering same-sex marriage, casting ballotsin favor or opposed, and sometimes changing their minds. They seepolitical leaders similarly reexamining their positions, and eitherreversing course or explaining adherence to old convictionsconfirmed anew. They see governments and businesses modifyingpolicies and practices with respect to same-sex couples, andparticipating actively in the civic discourse. They see countriesoverseas democratically accepting profound social change, ordeclining to do so. This deliberative process is making people takeseriously questions that they may not have even regarded asquestions before.When decisions are reached through democraticmeans, some people will inevitably be disappointed with theresults. But those whose views do not prevail at least know thatthey have had their say, and accordingly are—in the tradition ofour political culture—reconciled to the result of a fair and honestdebate. In addition, they can gear up to raise the issue later,hoping to persuade enough on the winning side to think again. “Thatis exactly how our system of government is supposed to work.”Post, at 2–3 (Scalia, J., dissenting).But today the Court puts a stop to all that. Bydeciding this question under the Constitution, the Court removes itfrom the realm of democratic decision. There will be consequencesto shutting down the political process on an issue of such profoundpublic significance. Closing debate tends to close minds. Peopledenied a voice are less likely to accept the ruling of a court onan issue that does not seem to be the sort of thing courts usuallydecide. As a thoughtful commentator observed about another issue,“The political process was moving ... , not swiftlyenough for advocates of quick, complete change, but majoritarianinstitutions were listening and acting. Heavy-handed judicialintervention was difficult to justify and appears to have provoked,not resolved, conflict.” Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy andEquality in Relation to Roe v. Wade, 63N.C. L.Rev. 375, 385–386 (1985) (footnote omitted).Indeed, however heartened the proponents of same-sex marriage mightbe on this day, it is worth acknowledging what they have lost, andlost forever: the opportunity to win the true acceptance that comesfrom persuading their fellow citizens of the justice of theircause. And they lose this just when the winds of change werefreshening at their backs.Federal courts are blunt instruments when itcomes to creating rights. They have constitutional power only toresolve concrete cases or controversies; they do not have theflexibility of legislatures to address concerns of parties notbefore the court or to anticipate problems that may arise from theexercise of a new right. Today’s decision, for example, createsserious questions about religious liberty. Many good and decentpeople oppose same-sex marriage as a tenet of faith, and theirfreedom to exercise religion is—unlike the right imagined by themajority—actually spelled out in the Constitution. Amdt. 1.Respect for sincere religious conviction has ledvoters and legislators in every State that has adopted same-sexmarriage democratically to include accommodations for religiouspractice. The majority’s decision imposing same-sex marriagecannot, of course, create any such accommodations. The majoritygraciously suggests that religious believers may continue to“advocate” and “teach” their views of marriage. Ante, at 27.The First Amendment guarantees, however, the freedom to“exercise” religion. Ominously, that is not a word themajority uses.Hard questions arise when people of faithexercise religion in ways that may be seen to conflict with the newright to same-sex marriage—when, for example, a religious collegeprovides married student housing only to opposite-sex marriedcouples, or a religious adoption agency declines to place childrenwith same-sex married couples. Indeed, the Solicitor Generalcandidly acknowledged that the tax exemptions of some religiousinstitutions would be in question if they opposed same-sexmarriage. See Tr. of Oral Arg. on Question 1, at 36–38. There islittle doubt that these and similar questions will soon be beforethis Court. Unfortunately, people of faith can take no comfort inthe treatment they receive from the majority today.Perhaps the most discouraging aspect of today’sdecision is the extent to which the majority feels compelled tosully those on the other side of the debate. The majority offers acursory assurance that it does not intend to disparage people who,as a matter of conscience, cannot accept same-sex marriage.Ante, at 19. That disclaimer is hard to square with the verynext sentence, in which the majority explains that “the necessaryconsequence” of laws codifying the traditional definition ofmarriage is to “demea[n] or stigmatiz[e]” same-sex couples.Ante, at 19. The majority reiterates such characterizationsover and over. By the majority’s account, Americans who did nothingmore than follow the understanding of marriage that has existed forour entire history—in particular, the tens of millions of peoplewho voted to reaffirm their States’ enduring definition ofmarriage—have acted to “lock ... out,” “disparage,”“disrespect and subordinate,” and inflict “[d]ignitary wounds” upontheir gay and lesbian neighbors. Ante, at 17, 19, 22, 25.These apparent assaults on the character of fairminded people willhave an effect, in society and in court. See post, at 6–7(Alito, J., dissenting). Moreover, they are entirely gratuitous. Itis one thing for the majority to conclude that the Constitutionprotects a right to same-sex marriage; it is something else toportray everyone who does not share the majority’s “better informedunderstanding” as bigoted. Ante, at 19.In the face of all this, a much different viewof the Court’s role is possible. That view is more modest andrestrained. It is more skeptical that the legal abilities of judgesalso reflect insight into moral and philosophical issues. It ismore sensitive to the fact that judges are unelected andunaccountable, and that the legitimacy of their power depends onconfining it to the exercise of legal judgment. It is more attunedto the lessons of history, and what it has meant for the countryand Court when Justices have exceeded their proper bounds. And itis less pretentious than to suppose that while people around theworld have viewed an institution in a particular way for thousandsof years, the present generation and the present Court are the oneschosen to burst the bonds of that history and tradition.*  *  *If you are among the many Americans—ofwhatever sexual orientation—who favor expanding same-sex marriage,by all means celebrate today’s decision. Celebrate the achievementof a desired goal. Celebrate the opportunity for a new expressionof commitment to a partner. Celebrate the availability of newbenefits. But do not celebrate the Constitution. It had nothing todo with it.I respectfully dissent.